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Brokerage Commissions, a direct cost: In the United States, if a house is sold, the seller’s broker typically receives six percent of the value of the house as commission (and splits this commission with the buyer’s agent). Thus, if a real estate agent manages to sell a house for $300,000, the commission is $18,000. Put differently, without an agent, the buyer and seller could have split the $18,000 between them. (Of course, brokers do many useful things, such as matching buyers and sellers, shepherding the selling process, etc., so the $18,000 may just be the intrinsic transaction cost to selling a house. However, inconsistent with this view, real estate commissions are much lower in other countries, and it is difficult to see why the cost of selling houses would be exactly 6% in practically all markets in the United States.)
Although only the seller pays the broker’s cost, it makes sense to think of transaction costs in terms of round-trip costs—how much worse you are off if you buy and then immediately sell an asset. You would mislead yourself if you thought that when you buy a house, you have not incurred any transaction costs because the seller had to pay them—you have incurred an implicit transaction cost in the future when you need to resell your investment. Of course, you usually do not immediately sell assets, so you should not forget about the timing of your future selling transaction costs in your NPV calculations.
Housing transaction costs are so high and so important that they are worth a digression. If you borrow to finance the investment, transaction may be higher than you think. The real estate agent earns 6% of the value of the house, not of the amount of money you put into the house. On a house purchase of $500,000, the typical loan is 80% of the purchase price, or $400,000, leaving you to put in $100,000 in equity. Selling the house the day after the purchase reduces the owner’s wealth of $100,000 by the commission of $30,000—for an investment rate of return of –30%. This is not a risk component; it is a pure and certain transaction cost.
Let us briefly consider what happens if the house price decreases or increases by 10%. If house prices decline by 10%, or the buyer overpays by 10%, the house can only be resold for $450,000, which leaves $423,000 after agent commissions. The house owner is left with $23,000 on a $100,000 investment. A 10% decline in real estate values has reduced the home owner’s net worth by 77%! In comparison, a 10% increase in real estate values increases the value of the house to $550,000, which means that $517,000 is left after real estate commissions. The house owner’s rate of return for the same up movement is thus only 17%.
With the tools you already know, you can even estimate how the value of a typical house might change if the Internet could instantly and perfectly replace real estate agents. You cannot be too accurate—you can only obtain a back-of-the-envelope estimate. A typical house in the United States sells every seven years or so. Work with a $1,000,000 house, and assume that the expected house capital-gain appreciation is 0%—you consume all gains as rental enjoyment. In this case, the house will stay at $1,000,000 in value, the commission will stay constant at$60,000 and will be paid every 7 years. If the appropriate 7-year interest rate were 40% (around 5% per annum), then the value of the brokerage fees would be a perpetuity of $60, 000/40% = $150, 000. The capitalized transaction cost would therefore have lowered the value of the $1,000,000 house by $150,000. If you could eliminate all commissions, e.g., by selling equally efficiently over the Internet, such a house would increase in value by about 15%. However, if you believed that the brokerage commission were to go up by the inflation rate (2% per annum, or 15% per 7-years), the friction would not be $150,000 but $240,000—more like 25% of the value of the house, not just 15%.
Other direct costs: In addition to direct agent commissions, there are also many other direct transaction costs. These can range from advertising, to insurance company payments, to house inspectors, to the local land registry, to postage—all of which cost the parties money.
Indirect and opportunity costs: Then there is the seller’s own time required to learn as much . about the value of the house as possible, and the effort involved to help the agent sell the house. These may be significant costs, even if they involve no cash outlay. After all, the seller could spend this time working or playing instead. Furthermore, not every house is suitable for every house buyer, and the seller has to find the right buyer. If the house cannot be sold immediately but stays empty for a while, the foregone rent is part of the transaction cost. The implicit cost of not having the house be put to its best alternative use is called an opportunity cost. Opportunity costs are just as real as direct cash costs.

Where do such market imperfections apply? In the world of large corporations, the interest rate spread between similarly risky borrowing and lending rates is often mild, so they can pretend they live in a “perfect” market in which they can separate the project choice from their financial situation. Their promised borrowing interest rates would still be higher than what they can receive investing their money in Treasury bonds—but, given that these large firms still have some possibility of going bankrupt, their expected borrowing cost of capital would probably be fairly similar to the expected rate of return that they could earn if they invested money into bonds with characteristics similar to those that they themselves issued.
In the world of individuals, entrepreneurs, and small companies, however, expected borrowing interest rates are often higher than expected saving interest rates. In fact, this issue of an extraordinarily high differential between expected borrowing and lending rates—and with it the role of cash-on-hand—is one important difference between “ordinary corporate finance” and “entrepreneurial finance.” Entrepreneurs find it very difficult to convey credibly their intent and ability to pay back their loans. As a consequence, many entrepreneurs even resort to financing projects with credit cards, which may charge a thousand basis points above Treasury bonds. These high borrowing costs can thus prevent rational entrepreneurs from taking many projects that they would undertake if they had the money on hand. It also means that more established firms or richer entrepreneurs should optimally take more projects than poorer entrepreneurs.
But be careful in the real world before you conclude this to be the case: Entrepreneurs tend to have notoriously over-optimistic views of their prospects. (Even venture capitalists, the financing vehicle for many high-tech entrepreneurial ventures, which advertise returns of 30%/year or more seem to have managed to return only a couple of percentage points above the riskfree rate over the last thirty years.) This may actually mean that entrepreneurs face only high promised borrowing costs, not high expected borrowing costs. Thus, the quoted spread between their borrowing and lending rates, which is really all that you can easily observe, likelyhas a large component that is due not to information disagreements but simply due to credit risk.